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STRESS CLAIMS UNDER THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT OF MARYLAND
Lauren A. Sfekas

In Maryland, as in many states, I the legislature has
enacted a comprehensive set ofworkers' compensation
laws designed to provide monetary benefits and necessary medical care to employees who suffer work-related
injuries. 2 Under the Maryland statute, an injured worker is entitled to compensation if he sustains an accidental personal injury.3 The statute defines an accidental
personal injury as "an accidental injury that arises out
of and in the course of employment."4 Case law has
further defined the term "accidental injury" to include
only those injuries which result from "some unusual
strain, exertion, or condition of employment."5
The Maryland Workers' Compensation statute provides benefits not only for accidental injuries, but also
for occupational diseases. 6 The courts have defined an
occupational disease as. "some ailment, disorder, or
illness which is the expectable result of working under
conditions naturally iriherent in the employment and
inseparable therefrom, and is ordinarily slow and insidious in its approach."? To recover, a claimant must
suffer a disability which is "due to the nature of an
employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist."8
The law is well settled that a physical injury which
results from an accidental injury or occupational disease
is compensable. 9 Recently, an increasing number of
workers have filed claims seeking compensation for
stress-related mental injuries. Claims for mental stress
have increased faster than any other type of claim for
workers' compensation. lo Because these cases provide
difficult causation issues due to the vague nature of
stress and the realization that emotional illness is often

caused by co-existing factors, II the courts have struggled to provide an objective framework for determining
the compensability of the increasing number of claims
for stress-related injuries.
There are many different types of mental stress
claims. The claims have developed primarily into three
categories -- physical-mental claims, in which a physical
traumaresuits inamentai injury; mental-physical claims,
in which a mental stimulus results in a physical injury;
and mental-mental claims, in which a mental stimulus
causes mental injuries.
The purpose ofthis article is to examine the current
treatment of stress claims in Maryland, particularly in
light of the recent decisions by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Foundation,
Inc. 12 and Davis v. Dyncorp.13
I. Physical-Mental Claims
A physical-mental claim arises when a physical
injury results in a mental condition. For example, a
worker may sustain a physical injury in an accident. The
physical injury then causes the worker to suffer anxiety
which prolongs or increases the disability. Across the
country, claims of this nature are found to be totally
compensable, including the effects of the emotional
disability.14 Courts have long recognized that the
physical injury itself helps to establish the validity of the
mental injury and its causal connection to the accident.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the
compensability of physical-mental claims as early as
1924 in Bramble v. Shields. IS In Bramble, the claimant
suffered a physical injury and thereafter became con-
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through a small opening. 29 Sargent, who suffered from
claustrophobia, blacked out immediately upon entering
the boiler.30 Initially, the court noted that the cleaning
of the boilers was an unusual condition even though it
was included in her overall job description. 31 The
employer, however, contended that the injury was still
not compensable because it arose from the mental
condition of claustrophobia and was not accompanied
by physical injury. After noting that Sargent blacked
out for several hours, the court concluded that this was
a sufficient physical reaction to qualify as an accidental
injury.32
II. Mental-Physical Claims
In Maryland, it is clear that before a mentalA mental-physical claim occurs when a claimant physical claim can be classified as a compensable accisuffers a physical injury or illness that results from a dental injury, it must meet the statutory definition of
mental occurrence. For instance, a
accidental injury. The mental stimclaimant may witness a shocking
ulus must be unusual and extraorIn Maryland, it is clear
event which causes him to have a
dinary to be compensable. Physheart attack. Maryland, I9 as well as
that before a mentaliological injuries which result from
all other states,2° has consistently
the
ordinary stresses of life, or
physical claim can be
ruled that claims of this nature are
from gradual stress which cannot
classified as a
compensable. Some states require
be classified as unusual, are not
compensable accidencompensable in Maryland. 33 In
that the mental stimulus be sudtal
injury,
it
must
meet
21
den. Others allow compensation
Whiting- Turner Contracting Co:
the
statutory
definition
even ifthe mental stimulus is gradv. McLaughlin,34 the court deual and a sudden, specific event
of accidental injury.
nied coverage for a claimant who
cannot be pinpointed. 22 Causal consuffered a stroke foHowing an
nection, of course, is more readily
argument at work. The court
established when the physical injury
explained that before a claim for
stress can be compensable, it must amount to more than
immediately follows the sudden mental stimulus.
The most notable mental-physical case in Maryland is J. the stress encountered in the average daily life. 35
Norman Geipe, Inc. v. Collett. 23 In Geipe, the claimant,
Although a physical injury caused by gradual mental
a truck driver, accidentally ran over another man. As a stress would not be compensable as an accidental injury,
result, Geipe developed immediate paralysis, had to be it may be compensable as an occupational disease,
removed from his truck, and was taken to the hospital. provided the claimant can show that the disability is
It was subsequently discovered that he had suffered a "due to the nature of the employment in which the
cerebral hemorrhage. 24 The court found that the cere- hazards ofthe occupational disease exist."36 This issue,
bral hemQrrhage and the resulting paralysis suffered by however, has never been definitively decided in MaryGeipe were physical in nature,25 and specifically stated land.
that an accidental personal injury results if there is a
nervous shock that produces a physiological injury.26 III. Mental-Mental Claims
In all of the above categories, the law is relatively
The compensability of mental-physical claims was
reaffirmed in Sargent v. Board of Education of Balti- settled. A much greater controversy, however, has
more County.27 Sargent was employed by the Board of arisen over "mental-mental claims." A claim of this
Education as a custodian. Part of her job description nature arises when a mental stimulus results in a mental
required that she clean boilers once a year. 28 The boilers or psychological injury. The issue of causation is much
were very dark and sooty and it was necessary to enter more difficult in this type of claim because there is no
the boiler by laying horizontally on a board which slid physical force which precisely establishes either the
vinced that his backbone was decaying. 16 This delusion
caused him to be permanently disabled. The doctors
indicated that his psychological condition was related to
the stress which resulted from the accident. 17 The court
of appeals affirmed the jury's verdict, finding that the
claimant's mental disorder was compensab Ie because it
was causally related to the original accidental injury at
work. 18 Claims ofthis nature are also compensable even
if the claimant suffered from a pre-existing mental
illness, provided the illness was aggravated by the
physical injury sustained at work.

cause or the extent ofthe injury. The emerging trend,
however, is to allow recovery in such cases. 37
In states that allow recovery for mental-mental
claims, some hold that such claims are compensable
only if there is a specific traumatic stimulus. 38 Other
states allow compensation for injuries which result from
gradual stress. 39
For a mental-mental claim to be compensable in
Maryland as an accidental injury, the claimant must
show that the stress encountered was "unusual. "40 As
previously discussed, a claim for mental stress as an
occupational disease will be allowed only if the claimant
can show that the mental injury is due to the nature of
the employment in which the hazards of the occupational disease exist. 41
In Belcher v. T Rowe Price Foundation, Inc. ,42 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland had its first opportunity
to determine whether purely mental injuries, without
any physical components, are compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act. In that case, Belcher was
employed in downtown Baltimore by T. Rowe Price as
a secretary. She was sitting at her desk when a threeton beam being hoisted by a construction crane came
loose and crashed through the ceiling, landing five feet
from her desk. 43 As a result of the traumatic incident,
she suffered sleep disturbance, nightmares, heart palpitations, chest pains, and headaches. She developed
serious emotional problems and came under the care of
a psychiatrist who diagnosed her as suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder. 44 Unlike the claimants in
Geipe and Sargent, Belcher never received treatment
for any physical complaints. 45 Her claim for benefits
was denied by the Workers' Compensation Commission. 46
In its analysis, the Belcher court sought to determine whether the phrase "accidental personal injury"
encompasses "mental" injuries. Because the Workers'
Compensation Act does not define the term "injury,"
the court reviewed the case law defining "accidental
personal injury" as used in the Workers' Compensation
Act, but found no definitive answer. 47 Therefore, the
court turned to tort cases for guidance.
The court found that "physical injury" as defined by
case law includes "demonstrable emotional distress"48
and that damages may be recovered for emotional
distress capable of objective determination. 49 The
Belcher court stressed, however, that the harm must be
capable of objective determination so as to provide

assurance that a claim is not spurious. 50 Where the harm
is capable of objective determination and the mental
distress appears to be real, no good reason can be found
for denying recovery. 51
After examining Maryland tort law, the court reviewed the philosophy of the Workers' Compensation
Act, which is to provide financial support and medical
benefits to victims of work-related accidents. 52 The
court noted that the inability to work and the loss of
earnings are the same whether pursued under the Act or
by way of damages in a tort action. Consequently, the
court concluded that the concept of "physical injury"
adopted in determining damages in torts cases should
also apply to the concept of "personal injury" in
awarding benefits in workers' compensation claims53
and that the recovery allowed under the Workers'
Compensation Act should be similar to the recovery
allowed in torts. The court stated that "[t]he provisions
ofthe Act do not prohibit it; expediency has not proved
to be a deterrent; the advances in medical science make
it feasible; logic supports it; the needs of society require
it. "54
After concluding that claims from mental injury are
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act,
the Belcher court cautioned that merely showing that a
mental injury was related to general conditions of
employment or incidents occurring over an extended
period of time is not enough to entitle the claimant to
compensation. 55 The mental inj ury must be precipitated
by an event that is unexpected and unforeseen.
Consistent with the accidental injury requirement of
Article 101,56 the Belcher court rejected the notion that
mental injury caused by gradual stress is compensable
as an accidental injury. However, the Belcher court left
open whether a claim for injuries caused by gradual
stress is compensable as an occupational disease.
Recently, in Davis v. Dynacorp,57 the court of
appeals was called upon to address the compensability
of a mental-mental claim as an occupational disease. In
Davis, the claimant sought compensation for a mental
disease which resulted from on-the-job harassment. 58
The claimant alleged that as a result of the harassment,
he experienced restlessness, sleeping problems, headaches, and developed post-traumatic stress syndrome,
all of which prevented him from returning to work. 59
The claimant asserted that he was entitled to workers'
compensation benefits because he had suffered a disabling occupational disease. 6o

Initially, the court of appeals addressed the issue of
whether Belcher precluded recovery as a matter oflaw
for post-traumatic stress syndrome arising from harassment by fellow employees. The court concluded that
Belcher, which states that "a mere showing that a
mental injury was related to general conditions of
employment, or to incidents occurring over an extended period of time, does not entitle the claimant to
compensation,"61 is specifically limited to accidental
injury claims and is not controlling in connection with
claims for occupational disease. 62 Having concluded
that Davis' claim was not prohibited by Belcher, the
court went on to address whether Davis had shown that
harassment was a hazard within the nature of his
employment, as required by the Maryland Workers'
Compensation Act. Davis was a computer operator and
the court stated that harassment by fellow employees is
not a hazard within the nature ofthe employment as a
computer data operator. There was nothing peculiar to
his activities that made him more susceptible to harassment than employees in other types of employment. 63
Accordingly, because the mental disease caused by
Davis' job harassment could not reasonably be characterized as due to the general character of his employment, the court held that Davis did not suffer from a
compensable occupational disease. 64
In its opinion, the court expressly stated that it was
not "willing to rule out the possibility that some gradually resulting, purely mental diseases could be
compensable occupational diseases or that there may be
circumstances where work-induced stress may result in
a compensable occupational disease."65 By limiting its
ruling to the issue ofwhether the harassment suffered by
Davis was due to the nature of his specific employment,
the court left open the question ofwhether mental stress
would be compensable as an occupational disease ifthe
claimant could show that it was due to the nature of
employment in which the risk of stress exists. If the
claimant were able to prove this requirement, it appears
that the court of appeals would allow compensation for
such a claim.

Conclusion
As stress in the workplace continues to increase,
stress-related compensation claims will rise proportionately. Maryland, as well as all other jurisdictions,
has a long history ofallowing recovery for mental stress
claims, provided there is some physical component to

the claim. If the stress results from a compensable
physical trauma, or if a stressful incident results in a
physiological reaction, recovery is routinely allowed.
The compensability of purely mental claims, however,
continues to generate controversy. With the decisions
in Belcher v. T Rowe Price Foundation, Inc. andDavis
v. Dynacorp, Maryland is clearly following the trend of
allowing a worker to recover for mental stress even in
the absence of any physical injury.
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